By Mathias Bonzo-Ewereko Boateng,
Accra, May 18,GNA – For the first time, France held its flagship Africa summit in an English-speaking country.
For the first time since 1970, it did so without a single former French colony on the guest list as host. And for the first time since the Sahel imploded, French President Emmanuel Macron had to sell “equal partnership” on ground where France has no colonial baggage to explain away.
The choice of Nairobi, and the choice of co-host Kenyan President William Ruto, tells you everything about where France is going.
The two-day Africa Forward Summit wrapped in Nairobi on 12 May 2026 with handshakes and billion-dollar deals.
Macron’s Africa policy which started in 2017 with a speech in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, promised to break with the past. Eight years later, the past broke him.
France has been expelled from Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad and Senegal. Military bases are closed. Security agreements are dead. In their place, Russia’s Wagner model and Chinese infrastructure deals have moved in.
By 2026, France’s diplomatic and military footprint in Francophone West Africa had shrunk to its smallest shape since independence. The term “Françafrique” went from a whisper to an accusation at every summit.
Today, Nairobi has became the pivot. French officials now openly say they are shifting “towards countries where it has more of a cultural and a different footprint”. Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, Rwanda, Ghana. Anglophone states with faster growth, less colonial history, and more appetite for Western capital.
The optics were about partnership. But the real substance was about the market (contracts).
Before Macron arrived, deals worth over $1 billion were announced. CMA CGM, the French shipping giant, committed €700 million to modernize Mombasa port in Kenya. TotalEnergies, Orange, and other French firms signed MOUs on clean energy, AI, and digital infrastructure.
France’s business lobby Medef made it clear by saying the goal is to “demolish the perception that French business has pulled out of Africa”. Right now, French firms are “playing in the second division” compared to Chinese and American competitors.
It is estimated that Kenya alone hosts over 150 French companies, making it France’s 5th largest Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) destination in Africa.
Macron didn’t hide it.
“A lot of solutions are made in the U.S. or made in China,” he said in Nairobi. “I think we have a common fight… which is to build our strategic autonomy for Europe and Africa. And if we build it together, we will be much stronger”.
What does it mean?
France cannot compete with China on checkbook diplomacy, and cannot match the US on military power. So Paris is selling “strategic autonomy” – a European-African bloc that can set its own rules on tech, energy, and trade.
Why Kenya?
Because it sits on the Horn of Africa, adjacent to Djibouti where France still has a base. Therefore, Paris sees it as strategic.
In February 2026, Kenya and France signed a defence cooperation deal that could allow French forces to operate from Kenyan soil.
For France, Nairobi is a way to stay in the Indo-Pacific conversation without relying on Djibouti alone.
Now the big question is, Ruto’s Nairobi Gambit: Pragmatic Deal-maker or Western Proxy?
Many have argued that When President William Ruto co-chaired the Africa Forward Summit with Emmanuel Macron in Nairobi, he placed Kenya at the centre of France’s attempt to reset its Africa policy. After losing military and political influence across the Sahel, France needed a new entry point. Ruto offered one: a stable, Anglophone economy with no colonial baggage and an appetite for investment.
The gambit produced quick wins. Over $1 billion in deals were announced, including €700 million from CMA CGM to modernize Mombasa port. Kenya and France signed a defence cooperation agreement, and Nairobi secured a platform to push its “Nairobi Declaration” on credit rating reform at the G7.
For Ruto, this fits a clear strategy: position Kenya as Africa’s pragmatic deal-maker, willing to work with the West, China, and the Gulf on terms that bring capital and technology home.
But we can also not loose sight of the fact that, hosting France so prominently risks making Kenya look like a proxy for a power trying to re-enter Africa after being expelled elsewhere. The carrying of placards by protestors in Nairobi reading “France Out of Africa” and “No to Neo-Colonial Deals.” underscores the view that Ruto seems to be trading sovereignty for short-term investment, repeating the dependency model that fueled resentment in West Africa.
For us at the Centre for Global Affairs and Responsible Governance, If the deals create jobs, lower borrowing costs, and transfer technology without locking Kenya into unfavorable contracts, Ruto strengthens his reputation as a leader who secures outcomes over ideology. If they result in debt, foreign-dominated projects, and limited local benefit, the “pragmatist” label collapses into “client state.”
Nairobi gave Ruto the stage. The next 12 months will show if he used it to negotiate, or to be negotiated for.
GNA
18 May 2026
Edited by Samuel Osei-Frempong
The writer is theExecutive Director of Centre for Global Affairs and Responsible Governance